Mo' Dernity, Mo' Problems
Monday, July 28, 2003
Sextus Empiricus: Selections from the Major Writings on Skepticism Man and God by Hallie, Sextus
I'm not even 1/2 way through, but a couple of interesting things have come up so far. First, it drives home the fact that scepticism did not begin with Descartes. For example, Sextus notes that men disagree about questions of theology and ethics, and argues that we have no means of deciding which of two beliefs about the gods, or about ethics, is correct. Because of this, Sextus believes we should suspend judgement. This looks surprisingly like today's moral relativism, which is supposed to be one of the hallmarks of modernity.
It's also interesting that Sextus protects himself from one of the classic cases against scepticism. Some would argue, "Well, if you don't know anything, then how do you know that scepticism is true?" Sextus would respond by saying that he is claiming to have proven that truth is, in general, unattainable. Rather, he would say that, "I'm not claiming to know that truth X is undiscoverable. Rather, I'm arguing that the basis by which people claim to hold X is insufficient."
Sextus is similar to Hume in that he believes skeptics should trust their experiences and the traditions of their society. As far as trusting experience, he does this by creating a sharp dicotomy between sense impression (which deals with externals) and metaphysical theory (which deals with the unseen, and therefore unprovable).
I'm not even 1/2 way through, but a couple of interesting things have come up so far. First, it drives home the fact that scepticism did not begin with Descartes. For example, Sextus notes that men disagree about questions of theology and ethics, and argues that we have no means of deciding which of two beliefs about the gods, or about ethics, is correct. Because of this, Sextus believes we should suspend judgement. This looks surprisingly like today's moral relativism, which is supposed to be one of the hallmarks of modernity.
It's also interesting that Sextus protects himself from one of the classic cases against scepticism. Some would argue, "Well, if you don't know anything, then how do you know that scepticism is true?" Sextus would respond by saying that he is claiming to have proven that truth is, in general, unattainable. Rather, he would say that, "I'm not claiming to know that truth X is undiscoverable. Rather, I'm arguing that the basis by which people claim to hold X is insufficient."
Sextus is similar to Hume in that he believes skeptics should trust their experiences and the traditions of their society. As far as trusting experience, he does this by creating a sharp dicotomy between sense impression (which deals with externals) and metaphysical theory (which deals with the unseen, and therefore unprovable).
Thursday, July 17, 2003
Archives
June 2002 July 2002 August 2002 September 2002 October 2002 February 2003 July 2003 August 2003 December 2003 June 2004 July 2004 August 2004 November 2004 May 2005 July 2005 October 2005 November 2005 February 2006 March 2006 April 2006 October 2006 November 2006 December 2006 January 2007 February 2007
